Every year we have a natural tendency to “grade” the Packers’ draft picks, usually by asking ourselves whether it was the person we would have taken at each spot. That’s fun for fueling debates with friends, but let’s be honest: neither we nor self-appointed media pundits are qualified to grade the Packers’ scouts and coaches. Our careers and reputations don’t depend on finding the right players to help the team win football games. Theirs do. Each spring they spend most of their waking hours thinking about who those players might be—and which ones the team needs most. 

The more informative question isn’t who we thought they should have taken at different spots, but why they took the players they did. Those are questions that can be answered, but only by trying to see the draft through the eyes of the Packers’ coaches and scouts. Here’s how they’d likely answer our questions about the draft this year.

*Going into the draft, what was the biggest priority on defense?

Help for the nickel package. With three-receiver sets now the norm in the NFL, defenses tend to play more nickel than base. The Packers were disastrous in nickel the past several years, unable to stop opponents from converting third downs regardless of yardage. New defensive coordinator Mike Pettine wasn’t going to put up with that problem. The Packers’ first three picks were defenders who will always be on the field in nickel, and they didn’t take another defensive player until seventh-rounder James Looney—who doesn’t fit Pettine’s base scheme, and can only play in nickel packages.

*Going into the draft, what was the biggest priority on offense?

Creating matchup problems. The offense bogged down often the last several years, with Rodgers playing matador in the pocket while receivers failed to shake cornerbacks. There two ways to solve that problem: (1) add an expensive free-agent or first-round receiver who can get open against anyone, or (2) collect a lot of lower-cost receivers who each specialize in getting open against a different type of cornerback. The Packers opted for the second approach. They drafted three receivers who each struggle against some types of corners, but victimize others. They give McCarthy options to mix and match each week depending on which cornerbacks are in the opponent’s lineup.

First Round

*Why did they take Jaire Alexander with their first-round pick?

Because Mike Pettine’s defensive scheme falls apart without good man-to-man cornerbacks, and Alexander was the best man cover cornerback available. He was probably even higher on the Packers’ board than Denzel Ward, who went fourth in the draft. Alexander is 15 pounds heavier, and Pettine prefers cover corners of that size—like he had on the Jets with Kyle Wilson.

*But what about Alexander’s height? Won’t teams just throw jump balls over him?

No. Alexander won’t be covering tall receivers who catch jump balls along the sidelines or down the field. Pettine has Kevin King (6’3” with a 39.5-inch vertical jump), Josh Jackson (6’0” with a 40-inch vertical), and Davon House for that. Alexander will be covering the Stefon Diggs types, shifter receivers that teams use on short and intermediate routes. He’s more perfectly suited for that task that anyone the Packers have had in a long, long time.

*But what about a first-round edge rusher? Are good cover cornerbacks really that important to Pettine’s defense?

Yes. In 2006, Rex Ryan’s and Mike Pettine’s Ravens defense was the best in the league, giving up only 12 points a game. No defense has done better since. Their signature strategy—frying QBs’ circuits by showing them pre-snap looks that didn’t match the defenders’ post-snap actions—worked to perfection. It caused quarterbacks to stop trusting their pre-snap reads and become indecisive in the pocket.

In 2007, with almost the exact same personnel, they fell to 22nd in the league. The difference? Their starting cornerbacks (Chris McAllister and Duane Starks) both got hurt and missed significant time. Opposing QBs didn’t need to rely on pre-snap reads. They just scanned the field for an overmatched cornerback, gave a nod to the receiver (just like Rodgers used to do with Jordy), and threw at him all game long. For the defense to work, Pettine must have cornerbacks who don’t give confused QBs an easy way out.

*If Alexander is so important, why didn’t the Packers just take him at 14? Why risk losing him with their down-up maneuver in the first round?

Because the risk was minimal, and the reward was significant. The Packers (like every team) put together pre-draft reports on other teams’ priorities and who they might be targeting to fill them. The teams who were then sitting at picks 15 (Oakland), 16 (Baltimore), and 17 (L.A. Chargers) didn’t need Alexander. The Ravens and Chargers are fine at cornerback, and the Raiders’ new defensive scheme prioritizes bigger bump-and-run corners.

Was it still a risk? Sure, another team could’ve traded into those picks to get Alexander. (The Bills traded into one of those spots to grab Tremaine Edmunds.) But the reward was substantial. In the down-up maneuver, the Packers effectively swapped a third-rounder this year for another first-rounder next year, a great value.

Second Round

*Why did they take Josh Jackson with their second-rounder? They already took Alexander!

Because the Packers had Josh Jackson as the top “big” cornerback in the entire draft, and his addition solves the Packers cornerback problems until 2021, when King’s rookie contract expires. The 6’3” King handles tall deep threats, the 6’0” Jackson handles medium-sized intermediate threats, and the 5’11 Alexander shuts down the smaller, shiftier guys.

To use the Falcons as an example, King would cover Julio Jones, Alexander would cover new addition Calvin Ridley, and Jackson would handle Mohamed Sanu. If he can avoid it, Pettine would rather not have Davon House, Josh Hawkins, or a 35-year-old, 182-pound Tramon Williams in man coverage against any of those guys.

*Why was Jackson the No. 1 “big” CB on the Packers’ draft board? He didn’t even play man coverage at Iowa.

Because Jackson has better tools for man coverage than any other big, outside corner in the draft. Man coverage on the outside requires a good vertical leap to contest high throws along the sidelines, and loose hips to change direction when receivers cut inside. Jackson has both. He jumps higher and has looser hips (measured by combine agility drills) than Minkah Fitzpatrick, Isaiah Oliver, Carlton Davis, M.J. Stewart, and Duke Dawson, the other outside corners taken in the first and second rounds. With a mid-4.4s 40-yard dash at his pro day, Jackson runs faster than most of them, too.

Jackson didn’t play much man-to-man coverage at Iowa, but there’s no reason to think he won’t do it well. Jackson was a former wide receiver himself, and he read receivers’ routes like a book last year. Further, while Pettine’s corners must be able to play man coverage, they don’t play tight man on every snap. There are plenty of short zones along the outside, and those are Jackson’s specialty. He had eight interceptions and 26 passes deflected last year, mostly in short zone coverage along the sidelines.

*Did the 49ers steal Dante Pettis from the Packers by trading up? Isn’t Pettis someone the Packers wanted?

No. As mentioned above, each team before the draft puts together their analysis of every other teams’ needs and possible targets, based on their schemes. Like most teams, the Packers try to feed false information into those other teams’ reports—primarily with their pre-draft visits and interviews, which are public information for the rest of the league. It’s to the Packers’ advantage to fool other teams into thinking that they’re looking for a certain player. Maybe a gullible team will jump right in front of them to draft one of those decoys, instead of a wiser team moving into that spot to steal someone they love.

That was the case with Pettis. Good front offices would know that the Packers had no interest. Pettis is thin and soft, and the Packers have never taken a receiver like that in the McCarthy era, at least in the first four rounds. (They’ve always drafted rugged receivers, like Jordy Nelson, Davante Adams, James Jones, Ty Montgomery, Randall Cobb, and Greg Jennings, who was thin but tough as nails.) The San Francisco 49ers, however, have the worst front office in the NFL. In early 2017, meddling trust-fund baby owner Jed York scared off good GM candidates like Brian Gutekunst and Elliot Wolf, and wound up settling for the inexperienced John Lynch. His staff was snookered by the Packers’ smoke screen on Pettis.

Third Round

*Why did they trade up for Oren Burks?

Because Blake Martinez might be excellent in run-down defense, but he was toasted in coverage as the Packers’ nickel linebacker last year. Pettine’s scheming doesn’t work if there’s a weak link in coverage. Burks was the third-best nickel linebacker in the whole draft, and by far the best available after Darius Leonard was selected at pick 36. Burks is perfect for nickel packages, where he can cover or use his speed to blitz the quarterback through open gaps. The Packers couldn’t take the chance that he wouldn’t last until their next pick.

*If Burks has those skills, why didn’t he go earlier in the draft?

Because he’s probably not ready for regular duty in base defense, for the Packers or anyone else. Burks is a former safety who is still learning the position and physically growing into it, and he gets tangled up too often with blockers around the line of scrimmage. He’ll get better with time. Once Burks is ready to play in the base defense, he’ll take the “Will” inside linebacker spot and push Martinez to the “Mike” position, which requires slightly more size and skill in avoiding blockers.

Later Rounds

*Why did they load up with three wide receivers? Were they just hedging their bets and hoping one of them works?

No, they want to use all of them to create favorable matchups for Rodgers to exploit. In the slot, Randall Cobb can run circles around slower slot corners, but he can’t get away from smaller and stickier ones. Enter fourth-rounder J’Mon Moore, who at 6’3” can tower over mighty-mite slot corners the same way Jordy Nelson did when he lined up as a slot receiver. Moore has little experience in the slot—he was mostly an outside receiver in college—but he has the right tools to do it: toughness in traffic, loose hips, and run-after-the-catch ability.

On the outside, the 13-syllable combo of Marquez Valdez-Scantling and Equanimeous St. Brown offer complimentary skills. Valdez-Scantling is a pure burner with 4.37 speed, threatening big press corners with deep-ball disaster if they miss their marks. He’s less of a threat against smaller corners who can keep up with him, because he isn’t a jump-ball specialist. St. Brown is the opposite. He struggles with physical press coverage, but he can eat smaller cornerbacks alive with his jump-ball skills and 6’5” height. Each week, McCarthy can look at the upcoming opponent’s second-best outside cornerback, and choose the appropriate weapon to employ. (Opponents’ best outside corner will be covering Davante Adams.)

*Why did they take Cole Madison in the fifth round, instead of some of those highly-rated, bigger linemen?

Because Madison fits the Packers’ scheme perfectly, and the big road-grading linemen do not. The big linemen are good for deep-passing teams that use stationery pockets, like the Steelers. Their sheer size can form a wall around the quarterback while he waits for his receivers to get deep. 

But the Packers’ offense is different. McCarthy runs a version of the Bill Walsh offense, which calls for quarterbacks to move around to find better angles for short and intermediate throws. That requires linemen with the feet to create moving pockets. The Packers are looking for linemen who can shuffle and mirror the way basketball players do when they’re guarding someone who’s dribbling the ball. They don’t want sumo wrestlers.

Madison is a foot-shuffling expert, and he has plenty of practice; he started four years for a Pac-12 offense that threw the ball 55 times a game. Madison can play two spots where the Packers need help (right guard and right tackle), and his feet are much lighter than those of Justin McCray or Kyle Murphy.

*Why did they draft a punter? Wasn’t Justin Vogel decent last year?

He was. But if McCarthy and Pettine want to play match-up games with a bevy of receivers and cornerbacks on the roster, then that leaves fewer roster spots for the safeties and linebackers who serve as the backbone of special teams coverage units. And if the Packers are going to have reduced quality in those units, then they better have a punter who booms the ball high and forces fair catches. That is JK Scott’s specialty. He routinely hits moonshots with five-second hang times, and half of them were fair-caught last year.

*Why did they spend a draft pick on a long snapper?

Because they don’t have one, and it’s an important job. Screw-ups on long snaps lead to loose-ball scrambles, where defenders get a free shot at smoking Mason Crosby and the new punter. They also lead to missed field goals, bad field position, and fumble returns for touchdowns. It’s not a position where the Packers want to take chances.

*Why did they draft James Looney in the seventh round? What role is he going to play?

Looney doesn’t fit Pettine’s base defense. His arms aren’t long enough to control tackles as a defensive end, and he doesn’t have the strength and leverage to get low and wrestle with guards in the trenches. (In Pettine’s base defense, the three defensive linemen control blockers to keep them out of the way of the linebackers, who make most of the plays.) But Looney does have quickness and agility to be an interior rusher in nickel packages, where his job will be to shoot gaps to get into the backfield.

*Why did they draft Kendall Donnerson in the seventh round? He wasn’t even a star in the Ohio Valley Conference. Why not draft someone who can help the team immediately, and sign projects like Donnerson as undrafted free agents?

Because guys with Donnerson’s athletic gifts are hard to find, and they are hot commodities in undrafted free agency. Everyone is intrigued, and every team wants to bring them into camp to see if they can play. By spending a late pick on Donnerson, the Packers give themselves the right to check him out first. If he looks like he can play, great; the Packers have him locked up with a four-year rookie contract. If not, no problem. They’ll cut him and wait until next year’s draft—when they’ll use their two first-round picks to add similarly special athletes who’ve already shown they can play.