There are several special provisions in the CBA that affect contracts which extend beyond 2020.  The two main rules are the Deion Rule and the 30% Rule.  Jason Fitzgerald of Overthecap.com has written about the 30% Rule in his particularly fine article, "Carson Wentz' New Contract and the CBA," which points out some loopholes teams can use to circumvent the rules  You can read Mr. Fitzgerald's article here.

The Deion Rule:

In 1995 Deion Sanders signed a 7-year contract worth, on paper, $35 million.  The contract scheduled $1M in base salaries over the first three years to go with a $12 million signing bonus.  At the time, teams could prorate the signing bonus over the entire 7 year length, so the proration was only roughly $1.7M per season.  That allowed Sanders to play for cap charges of $1.89, $2.2, and $2.05 million for the first three season even though he had received $13 million, or roughly $4.33 million per season.  Remember, the salary cap in 1995 was just $37.7 million.

The NFL and Union quickly passed the Deion Rule to prevent such a thing from happening again.  The gist of the rule requires the P5 salary (base salaries plus roster, work out, and reporting bonuses) to at least equal the signing bonus prorations for the first three years.  This rule specifies exactly what counts as salary, and does not list incentives or escalators.  At present, signing bonuses could only be prorated over a maximum of 5 years. 

Under the Deion Rule, the $1.7 million per year proration (which totals $5.1 million) would have to be matched by $5.1 million in salary.  That means Dallas would have had to take $10.2 million in cap charges over the first three years instead of the $6.14 million Dallas put on the salary cap, a difference of $4M.  

The 30% Rule:

This rule looks nasty.  It states that for any contracting extending beyond the current CBA's term, "Salary" can increase by a maximum of just 30% of the salary scheduled for 2020, the final league year.  Absent finding some loopholes, that would make signing players with contracts that expire after the 2019 season very difficult.  For example, signing Martinez would be difficult using the Packers' normal structure.  Let us assume 4 years, $36 million.

Here, the Packers give Martinez a $12 million signing bonus and "salary" consisting of the minimum base ($820,000), plus $500,000 in work out and game active bonuses.  So, "Salary" scheduled for 2020 would be $1.82 million, and it can increase by a maximum of 30% each year ($546,000 per year).  This normal contract above violates the Deion Rule because the signing bonus prorations for the first three years of the contract add up to $9 million while the salary adds up to only 7.09 million.  It also does not add up to enough money.  Total cash over four years is $22.55M, or $5.63M AAV, which I do not think Martinez would accept.

To comply, the Packers would have to increase the "Salary" portion paid in 2020 to Martinez by many millions, but that increases his cap number by a corresponding amount.  The problem is Green Bay is projected to have just $13.7M in cap space in 2020, plus rollover (but one would assume that the Packers want to roll over money into 2021. 

The solution is to find a loophole or three.  Jason Fitzgerald points out several loopholes and illustrated how the Eagles used them to sign Carson Wentz recently.  One trick is to find money that can be paid to the player but is not recognized as "Salary" by the CBA.

One loophole has been dubbed "Log Escalators" by Mr. Fitzgerald.  Escalators (unless fully guaranteed, which is rare in the NFL) are always "not likely to be earned," and thus not recognized by the CBA for cap purposes as salary.  Even if a player accomplishes whatever is required in 2020 to trigger an escalator for 2021, the player still has to make the team in 2021 to earn the money.  So the team can make the escalator so easy to earn that all the player has to do is to fall off the proverbial log to earn it.

Jason Fitzgerald's article on the Carson Wentz contract illustrates a real life example of a team using escalators to circumvent the 30% Rule.  Naturally, the deal is complicated. Wentz signed a four-year, $128 million extension, or $32M AAV.  The signing bonus was just $16.367 million, which is unusually low for a quarterback, but over $66M is fully guaranteed at signing and $107M is virtually guaranteed. Here are the details:

 A few things.  Wentz' rookie deal called for a $7.9 million cap charge in 2019, so his cap hit increased by $500,000.  The 2019 signing bonus proration consists of the $3.27 million plus the $4.4 million prorated signing bonus from his rookie deal.  The 5th year option for QBs in 2020 was estimated at $22.7 million, so the Eagles saved $4 million on the cap there.  The Wentz contract is analagous to extending Kenny Clark now: both players have completed the bare minimum of three seasons before an extension is allowed, and both have a 5th-year option for 2020.

Another loophole is that option bonuses are optional and thus are considered not likely to be earned, so the Eagles put in a $30 million option bonus in year two of the contract (2020).  It is treated as if were a signing bonus when calculating "Team Salary Cap" but the proration is simply "Salary" as to the player.  So when exercised it is prorated like a signing bonus for the team but the prorated portion for each year of an option bonus ($6M here) is considered "Salary" for purposes of the 30% rule.  Wentz is willing to do that because if the Eagles do not exercise the option bonus, Wentz' base salary increases from $1.38 million to $31.38 million and becomes fully guaranteed. That would increase his cap hit from $18.6 to $42.65 million for 2020.  That is not going to happen.  Wentz also would have $62 million in dead money, so he will not be cut.

Note that Wentz' 2020 "Salary" is $1.38M plus an $8M roster bonus plus the $6M option bonus proration, for a total of $15.38M, and 30% of that is $4.614M.  So, Wentz' 2021 "Salary" can increase by $4.61, that is from $15.38M to $19.99M maximum.  Except his 2020 salary as shown is $15.4M base plus $10M Roster plus $6M option bonus, or $31.4M.  That should violate the 30% rule. 

Enter the next loophole: the log escalator.  Wentz' actual 2021 base salary as written in the contract is for $3.9M (which complies with the 30% Rule) but he can earn $11.5M in escalators if he or the team shows improvement year over year in any of "a ton of" categories or if Wentz is named to the Pro Bowl in 2020.  Once that is triggered and earned Wentz' base salary jumps from $3.9M to $15.4M, and his "Salary" resets to $31.4M for 2021, so there are no more 30% Rule issues for subsequent years.

What are the Speed Bumps caused by these rules for the Packers?

Wentz' signing bonus was abnormally low.  The cash flow in year one and two was reversed from what is normal, and the player accepted non-guaranteed escalators later in the contract.  Wentz can accept the escalators because his dead money is so large that the Eagles would have a tough time cutting him as late as 2022 even if it became apparent that the team had made a ghastly mistake.  Truly massive dead money will not be a feature of any contracts for any of the players the Packers might want to extend now or re-sign in 2020.

The Packers can be expected to use log escalators, option bonuses, or any device that is treated as if it were a signing bonus but counts as "Salary" to retain the players they covet.  Let's consider Martinez and Clark.  I confess that I had trouble constructing a contract for Martinez wherein the 2020 cap is not almost half of the Packer's $13.7 million projected cap space.  Here is an example of an extension for Martinez.

I do not love this contract extension.  There is a fair amount of dead money, and the $6.5 million cap hit for 2020 is a lot considering that the Packers are expected to have $13.7 million in cap space in 2020 (plus rollover).  It also reduces 2019 cap rollover by $300,000.  Since Martinez is scheduled to earn $2.025 million, the new money over the four-year extension would be $8.78 million AAV.  He would have almost $2 million in cap savings in 2021 if cut (and if the new CBA still has a June designation) with $3 million dead in 2022 as well. 

If one wanted to knock down the $6.5 million cap hit, the Packers could reduce Martinez' $2.95 million base pay in 2020 to the minimum of $820,000 to get a $4.37 million cap charge for 2020, and then use escalators to balloon his base pay in 2021 to make up for the lost cash.  That would require some trust, and the cash flow in year one and two would not be great.

Extending Kenny Clark could take a similar path:

Since Clark was scheduled to have cap charges of $2.978 and $7.69 million for a total of $10.668 million, his proposed cap hits of $2.32 and $8.72 million increases Clark's cap hit total over 2019 and 2020 by just $352,000.  The team could reduce Clark's base salary in 2020 and just use an escalator, but Clark could be cut.  His cap savings would be a negative $6 million if cut in March of 2021.  This structure follows the pattern in the Wentz contract with the cash being more in the second year than the first.  The new money AAV is $13.713 million. 

Extending Clark makes more sense than I had previously supposed, but there is more risk for the team.  It will be interesting to see if the Packers extend anyone before the start of the season.  Again, Mr. Fitzgerald's article is well worth reading.  You can use the hyperlink above or paste https://overthecap.com/carson-wentz-new-contract-and-the-cba/ into your browser.